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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
MARY HOLLOWAY,

Case No. 18219

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against defendant-appellant, Mary Holloway and others, alleging
that said defendants did unlawfully cause the death of another
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-203 (1953
as amended), second degree murder, a felony of the first degree.
The defendant-appellant appeals the judgment and conviction
rendered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant seeks to have her conviction reversed based
on the failure of the trial court to give the properly requested
jury instructions on the lesser included offense of Manslaughter,
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-205 (1953 as amended), or
in the alternative, judgment to be entered for manslaughter.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant, Mary Holloway, was charged with murder
in the second degree for the death on March 15, 1981, of Samuel
Taylor Beare, IV.

Her trial was joined with that of Charles

Creer, however the action of a third defendant, Thomas Garcia
was not joined for trial.

Garcia was ultimately convicted

of Second Degree Murder in a separate trial.
A jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, from September 28, 1981,
to October 1, 1981, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.
At trial conflicting evidence was heard concerning the culpability
of appellants Holloway and Creer, and of Mr. Garcia.

Most

testimony agreed that Mr. Garcia was chiefly responsible for
the events of March 15th.
The evidence at trial showed that a vehicle was observed
in the area of East High School in the early morning hours
of October 1, 1981, and that an individual or individuals were
seen to be struggling with an unconscious individual.

The

evidence ultimately showed the unconscious individual
to be the deceased, and that after the deceased was left in
the area of East High School, the individual or individuals
exited the area and were later stopped and a struggle ensued
between Officer Ryan and Thomas Garcia who ultimately fled.
The appellants, Holloway and Creer, were apprehended and later
released.

It was the impression of arresting officer Ryan

that the appellants "were intoxicated or on something to impair
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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them physically" (T. at 6).

The appellant Holloway, was at

no time seen touching the body of the deceased or assisting
in its movement from the car (T. at 11 and 24) and although
at the time of his arrest Garcia was covered with blood, and
his fingers were broken (T. at 211-222), no blood was observed
on the person of appellant Holloway.

(T. at 214)

These physical

facts conflicted with the testimony of Patrick Dumas who indicated
that the appellant Holloway, said "Tonuny went crazy last night
and killed Sam Beare" and paused and said "well really we all
killed him".

(emphasis supplied)

The theory of the defense at trial was that the appellants,
Garcia , and Beare had been drinking that evening and that
an altercation ensued between Garcia and Beare, and that in
the appellant's attempt to stop Beare from besting Garcia, that
Beare was killed.

The evidence showed that Beare had a blood

alcohol content of .19% (T. at 208) and that a drug screen
showed numerous controlled substances in his blood stream at
the time of his death.

(T. at 202-203)

Due to the evidence and circumstances that mitigated
appellant Holloway's culpability, counsel for appellant submitted
a proposed Instruction on manslaughter (R. 110).

Upon rejection

of this instruction, counsel made a timely objection (R. 484).
Whereupon the court submitted instead Instruction No. 27 to
the jury (R. 29), directing that the verdict must be either
guilty of criminal homicide, murder, second degree; or not
guilty.

No instruction was given as to any possible lesser

included offense.

After deliberating over eleven hours, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of guilty (R. 52).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER CONSTITUTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
It is appellant's contention that the trial judge in
the instant case was legally obligated to instruct the jury
on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.

1

The court's

failure to so instruct is substantial and constitutes reversible
error.
Because the term 'homicide' "embraces every mode by
which the life of one person is taken by another" 2 , it is clear
that both second degree murder and manslaughter fit within
the broad category of homicide.

Appellant submits that manslaughter

is merely a less severe degree of homicide than second degree
murder, and thus is included therein.
Support for this position is found in Farrow v. Smith,
541 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1975) where the Utah Supreme Court
cites Clown Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W. 2d 625 (1960),
wherein that court stated:

1. Counsel for appellant requested :in writing and took exception to the trial
court's failure to give such requests to the jury, properly preserving this
issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. State v. Erickson,
Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1977); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (1977); and State v. GleasO!h
17 U.2d 150, 405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord: Rules of Practice :in the District
Courts, Rule 5.4
2.

40 Am. Jur. Hanicide §1.

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. . . where the defendant was charged with murder
in the s7co~d degree but convicted of manslaughter,
the conviction was proper, and the crime of manslaughter
was an included offense.
Further support is found in State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092,
1097 (Utah 1981) citing State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah
1978).

There the Court held that carrying a loaded firearm

in a vehicle was not a lesser included offense of carrying
a concealed dangerous weapon.

In so doing, the court distinguished

these crimes from that of homicide, "with the various lesser
degrees thereof."
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended) defines second
degree murder as follows:
Murder in the second degree.---(1) Criminal homicide
constitutes murder in the second degree if the
actor:
(a) Intentnionally or knowingly causes the
death of another; or
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of another;
or
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing
a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another and thereby causes the death of
another; or
(d) While in the commission, attempted commission,
or innnediate flight from the connnission or attempted
connnission of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape,
forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary
aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, causes the
death of another person other than a party.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of
the first degree.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended) defines manslaughter
as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Manslaughter.---(!) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a)

recklessly causes the death of another;

or
(b) Causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse; or
(c) Causes the death of another under circumstances
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances
provide a moral or legal justification or extenuation
for his conduct although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended).
The factor which distinguishes second degree murder
from manslaughter is malice.

The Supreme Court noted this

in Farrowv. Smith, supra, wherein it stated:
For many years the definition of second degree
murder has been the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforthought and that of manslaughter
was the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. In our opinion the new criminal code has
not changed those definitions. Id. at 1109, (the
court was interpreting the above quoted statutes
as they were set forth in the 1975 pocket supplement
to the Utah Code.)
The test given to determine if one offense is a lesser
included offense of another is that found in the recently revised
Utah Criminal Code.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended) ,

provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense other"7i.& ca .i.a'111iWilliae
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(c) It is specifically ~esignated by a statute
as a lesser included offense.
The process by which such a determination is made was described
in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934):
The only way this matter may be determined is by
discovering all of the elements required by the
respective sections, comparing them and by a process
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those common
and those not common, and, if the greater offense
includes all legal and factual elements, it may
safely be said that the greater includes the lesser,
if, however, the lesser offense requires the inclusion
of some necessary element or elements in order
to cover the completed offense, not so included
in the greater offense, then it may be safely said
that the lesser is not necessarily included in
the greater.
(33 P.2d at 645)
Section 76-1-402(4) states:
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge
the jury with respect to an included offense unless
there is rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
A proper reading of the above section demonstrates that
where a rationalbasis for instructing on a lesser included
offense exists, the court is obligated to charge the jury thereon.
Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to require presentation
of the Manslaughter instruction to the jury.

Appellant requests

that this Court "survey the evidence and inferences which admit

3. This statute was recently intepreted in State v. Lloyd, Utah, 568 P. 2d 357
(1977), and its canpanion case, State v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d 360 (1977),
wherein this court held that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included
offense of theft of an operable noter vehicle.

-7-
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of rational deduction, to determine if there exists reasonable
basis upon which a conviction of the lesser offense could rest."
4
State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976).
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT TO
SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS.
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that
an accused in a criminal case has the right to submit to the
jury his theory of the case, and that such theory, when properly
requested, should be given to the jury in the form of written
instructions.

State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions
on all defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses,
when such are properly requested by the accused.

State v.

Gillian, 23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson,
Utah, 560 P.2d 1120 (1977).
An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial
strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions
on a lesser included offense if his theory of defense so dictates.
State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1977); State v. Gellaty,
22 U.2d 149, 152 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Valdez,79 U.2d
426, 428, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70,
278 P.2d 618 (1955).

However, when the accused, as his theory

4. Interpreting Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953 as amended), a precursor to
§76-1-402. (See, also, State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970).
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the case, requests instructions on lesser included offenses
and is willing to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury
on that theory, the trial court as a general rule is duty bound
to submit these alternatives to the trier of the fact.

State

v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 374, 375, 463 P.2d 811 (1970).
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as
charged in the Information, but some lesser offense, the teachings
of Gillian apply.

On this point the Gillian court stated:

One of the fundamental principles to the submission
of issues to juries is that where the parties so
request they are entitled to have instruction
given on their theory of the case; and this includes
on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the
evidence would support such a verdict. State v.
Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 374.
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for this
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such
a rule.

This court said it should not be the prerogative of

the trial court to direct the jury as to what degree of crime
they may find a defendant guilty or to direct them that they
must find him not guilty if they do not find him guilty of
the greater offense.

To allow this permits the court to be

a judge of the facts and to in effect direct a verdict on the
lsser included offenses.

Such a procedure violates the historical

spirit as well as letter of our system of jury trial under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Unites States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.2d 55 (1929) (Straup,

J. concurring).

See also United States v. Skinner, 437 F.2d

164, 165
(5th Cir. 1971).
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Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court have declared as a matter of policy and procedural safeguard
the right of a defendant to receive instructions on a lesser
offense if such is supported by evidence or if there is some
doubt as to elements of the greater offense.

In State v. Mewhinney,

42 Utah 498, 134 P. 632, the Utah Court stated:
In passing this point we desire to say that
a trial court should, in every case where there
is any direct or inferential evidence with respect
to the different degrees of murder, charge the
jury with regard to all the degrees, and this rule
should be followed where there may be any doubt
with regard to whether the higher degree is established
or not. This is contemplated by our statute which
divides crimes into degrees and which requires
the jury to find in the lesser degree in case of
doubt. State v. Mewhinney, 42 Utah 498, 134 P.
632, 639.
In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court held:
While we have never held that a defendant
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
as a matter of due process, the nearly universal
acceptance of the rule in both state and federal
courts establishes the value to the defendant of
this procedural safeguard. That safeguard would
seem to be especially important in a case such
as this. For when the evidence unquestionably
establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious,
violent offense---but leaves some doubt with respect
to an element that would justify conviction of
a capital offense---the failure to give the jury
the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included
offense would seem inevitably to enahnce the risk
of an unwarranted conviction.
While this is not a capital case, neither does appellant rely
solely on public policy, but also on case law and Utah statutes,
supra.

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In State v. Bartias, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937),
this court noted that the failure to give an instruction on
lesser included offenses when requested " . . . clashes with
two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases:

It has the

effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiting
the jury to a consideration of only part of the evidence (the
defendants'):

and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the

burden of proving his innocence or justification."

(65 P.2d

at 1132).
When the accused requests a lesser included instruction
there should exist a prestimption that the requested instruction
5
be given.
Such is the tenor of this court's discussions in
the past.

In State v. Hymas, 64 U. 285, 230 P.2d 349 (1924),

it was stated:
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a
trial court to withhold from the jury the right
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included
offense, and determine the question of the state
of the evidence as a matter of law. That should
be done only in very clear cases. (64 U.2 at 297).
Accord: State v. Barkas, 91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d
1130 (1937). [Emphasis Supplied]
In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included
offenses when requested.
5. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian, supra, 23 U. 2d
at 376, wherein it said:
The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, is that we
review the record in the light favorable to the jury's verdict.
However, in this situation where the question raised relates to
the refusal to submit included offenses, it is our duty to survey
the whole evidence and the inferences naturally to be deduced
Sponsored
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The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a lesser
included offense was described in State v. Dougherty, supra.
This court cited Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592
(1966), which followed a provision similar to Utah Code Ann.
§77-33-6 (1953).

Describing the holding of the Nevada Court

this court said:
The Court discussed three situations in which the
problem of lesser included offenses are frequently
encountered. First, where there is evidence which
would absolve the defendant from guilt of a greater
offense, or degree, but would support a finding
of guilt of a lesser offense, or degree; the instruction
is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support a
finding of guilty in the connnission of the lesser
offense or degree. For example, the defendant
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and
thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict;
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and
some element essential to the lesser offense is
either not proved or shown not to exist. This
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser
included offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where
the elements of the greater offense include all
elements of the lesser offense; because, by its
very nature, the greater offense could not have
been connnitted without defendant having the intent
in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser
included offense. In such a situation instructions
on the lesser included offense may be given, because
all elements of the lesser offense have been given.
However, such an instruction may properly be refused
if the prosecution has met its burden of proof
on the greater offense, and there is no evidence
tending to reduce the greater offense. The court
concluded by stating that if there be any evidence,
however slight, on any reasonble theory of the
case under which the defendant might be convicted

-12-
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of a lesser included offense, the court must, if
requested, give an appropriate instruction.
(550 P.2d at 176-177). 6
The question that arises then when lesser included instructions
are requested is:

was there " . . . any evidence, however slight,

on any reasonable theory under which the defendant might be
convicted of the lesser [and] included offense . . . " of criminal
trespass.

State v. Dougherty, supra, at 177; State v. Bell,

Utah, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977) (Justice Wilkins, concurring).
If there was such evidence, then the instructions were properly
requested and should have been submitted to the jury for consideration.
POINT III
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION AND DENIAL OF THAT ENTITLED INSTRUCTION
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant submits that substantial evidence was presented
at trial in the instant case to which a reasonable view, based
on appellant's theory of the case, would support presentation
of the instruction for the lesser included offense.

For example,

appellant's testimony indicated that she did not participate
in the confrontation between the victim and Tonnny Garcia (T.
243-244).

Appellant also indicated that everyone had been

drinking heavily (T. 242).

This testimony was substantiated

by Officer Nelson who indicated that it was his "impression
that they were intoxicated or on something to impair them physically."
(T. 6- 7) .

6. State v. ~erty, supra, has been followed in State v. Pierre, Utah 572
P.2d 1338, 13~977), and State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977).
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Besides appellant's own testimony, there was evidence
that she did nothing with the body of the victim (T. 13), nor
was there any blood on her person (T. 14).

Also, the evidence

showed that appellant was merely a passenger in the car (T.
26).

Further, there was absolutely no evidence introduced

at trial to indicate that appellant aprticipated in the homicide.
She was merely present.
The above mentioned factors clearly justify the need
for giving an instruction on the lesser included offense of
manslaughter.

It is at least reasonable to assume that the

jury could have, as the triers of fact, found appellant to
have been reckless, and thus within subsection (a) of the Manslaughter
statute.
A portion of the evidence relied on by appellant is
her own testimony.

However, this fact itself does not per

se destroy its credibility.

In State v. Larry Elliot and Harrison

Clayton, Nos. 17350, 17351, 17358 (Utah, January 21, 1982)
the Utah Supreme Court found that a defendant's testimony,
when received, has the same status as any other evidence, and
is to be considered by the jury, who can then decide its crediblity.
This statement by the court has support in another recent
case.

In State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, (Utah 1980) (original

emphasis) the court, in discussing lesser included offenses,
stated:
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If there be any evidence, however slight, on any
reasonable theory of the case, under which defendant
might be convicted of a lesser included offense,
the trial court must, if requested, give an appropriate
instruction.
(Id. at 1232).
There is no question that in the instant case at least some
evidence was introduced to require the requested instruction
on manslaughter.

The trial judge's failure to leave such a

determination to the jury to decide constitutes reversible
error, under both Chestnut and Elliot.
It is also important to note that the facts introduced
at trial vis-a-vis Tormny Garcia could reasonably support a
manslaughter instruction on his part, regardless of the serious
nature of the wounds.
(Utah 1976).

(See State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298

Since appellant is basically in a position of

an accomplice, those facts, as applied to Garcia, should justify
a manslaughter instruction as to appellant.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that sufficient evidence
was introduced at trial to warrant an instruction on manslaughter.
The trial judge's failure to so instruct constitutes reversible
error and appellant requests this Court to so rule.
DATED this

~

day of June, 1982.
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